Auer deference, courts deferring to agencies’ reasonable interpretations of their ambiguous regulations, is alive following the Supreme Court’s decision in Kisor v. Wilkie. But, in the opinion of a few Justices, it is only on life support.
The State and Local Legal Center (SLLC) filed an amicus brief in this case asking the Supreme Court to overturn Auer v. Robbins (1997). In that case the Supreme Court reaffirmed its holding in Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co. (1945), that courts must defer to an agency’s interpretation of its own regulations.
As discussed in the SLLC amicus brief, states and local governments object to Auer deference because it gives agencies a lot of power. They both write regulations and may interpret them as they like without significant court scrutiny. Agencies aren’t required to receive notice-and-comment related to their interpretations of regulations. New administrations may change the interpretations at their whim. And agencies may purposely write ambiguous regulations knowing courts will defer to their interpretations of them. If Auer deference wasn’t available, courts would interpret regulations without deferring to agency interpretations of them.
In Moda Health Plan v. United States the Supreme Court will decide whether Congress may enact appropriations riders restricting the sources of funding available to pay health insurers for losses incurred that were supposed to be paid per federal law.
The Affordable Care Act’s (ACA) risk corridor program provided that if a health insurance plan participating in the exchange lost money between 2014-2016 it would receive a payment from the federal government based on a formula defined in the statute. If it made money the plan had to pay the federal government based on a formula. The purpose of the program was to induce health insurance companies to offer plans on the exchange despite the fact they didn’t have reliable data to price the plans.
The Government Accountability Office (GAO) identified a particular funding source the federal government could use to make payments. Congress passed appropriations riders for all three years disallowing that funding source to be used to make risk corridor payments.
Rarely does a Supreme Court case implicate the work of state legislatures like Georgia v. Public.Resource.org. In this case the Court will decide whether a state may copyright statutory annotations.
Georgia, through a Code Revision Commission, made up of the Lieutenant Governor, the Speaker of the House, members of the Senate and House, and others, contracts with Lexis to draft the statutory annotations published in the Official Code of Georgia Annotated (OCGA).
Annotations include “history lines, repeal lines, cross references, commentaries, case notations, editor’s notes, excerpts from law review articles, summaries of opinions of the Attorney General of Georgia, summaries of advisory opinions of the State Bar, and other research references.”
The Kimberley Rice Kaestner trust is governed by New York law and its trustee is a New York resident who has “absolute discretion” to distribute the trust. When the trustees, Kimberley Rice Kaestner and her children, lived in North Carolina the state taxed the income of the trust even though no funds were distributed during the time period. The trust sued North Carolina seeking the $1.3 million it paid in taxes. The trust argued that the tax violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Let’s hope Justice Kagan is wrong about this ominous prediction in her dissenting opinion in Knick v. Township of Scott: “today’s decision means that government regulators will often have no way to avoid violating the Constitution.”
In a 5-4 opinion the Supreme Court held that a property owner may proceed directly to federal court with a takings claim. In Knick the Court overturned Williamson County Regional Planning Commission v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City (1985), which held that before a takings claim may be brought in federal court, a property owner must first seek just compensation under state law in state court. The State and Local Legal Center (SLLC) amicus brief urged the Court to keep Williamson County.
In Gundy v. United States the Supreme Court held 5-3 that the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act’s (SORNA) delegation of authority to the Attorney General to apply SORNA’s requirements to pre-Act offenders doesn’t violate the constitution’s nondelegation doctrine.
SORNA, enacted in 2006, is Congress’s third sex offender registry law. It was intended to be more comprehensive than the previous two. It covers “more sex offenders, and imposes more onerous registration requirements, than most States had before.”
SORNA states “[t]he Attorney General shall have the authority to specify the applicability of the requirements of this subchapter to sex offenders convicted before the enactment of this chapter.” In 2007 the Attorney General issued an interim rule stating that SORNA’s registration requirements apply in full to pre-Act offenders.
McDonough v. Smith is a case about forgery, deceit, fabricated evidence…and statute of limitations.
In this case the Supreme Court held 6-3 that the statute of limitations for a fabrication of evidence claim begins running upon acquittal. The State and Local Legal Center (SLLC) filed an amicus brief arguing the statute of limitations should begin running earlier.
Edward McDonough, commissioner of the county board of elections, processed forged absentee ballots, which he claimed he didn’t know were forged. Youel Smith was appointed to investigate and prosecute the matter. McDonough claims Smith “falsified affidavits, coached witnesses to lie, and orchestrated a suspect DNA analysis to link McDonough to relevant ballot envelopes.” The first trial involving McDonough ended in a mistrial. He was acquitted in a second trial.
The Bladensburg Peace Cross may stay the Supreme Court ruled in a 7-2 decision in American Legion v. American Humanist Association.According to Justice Alito, writing for the majority of the Court: “It has become a prominent community landmark, and its removal or radical alteration at this date would be seen by many not as a neutral act but as the manifestation of ‘a hostility toward religion that has no place in our Establishment Clause traditions.’” The State and Local Legal Center (SLLC) filed an amicus briefin this case supporting the local government.
In late 1918, residents of Prince George’s County, Maryland, decided to erect a memorial to honor soldiers from the county who died in World War I. The monument, completed in 1925, is a 32-foot tall Latin cross that sits on a large pedestal. Among other things, it contains a plaque listing the names of 49 local men who died in the war. Over the years, memorials honoring the veterans of other conflicts have been added to the surrounding area. In 1961, the Maryland-National Capital Park and Planning Commission acquired the Cross and the land it is on in order to preserve it and address traffic-safety concerns.
May a private entity running a public access channel ban speakers based on the content of their speech—something a government entity running the same channels could not do? Yes, the Supreme Court held in a 5-4 opinion inManhattan Community Access Corporation v. Halleck. Why? Because the First Amendment doesn’t apply to private entities in this instance.
The Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984 authorizes states and local governments to require cable operators to set aside channels on their cable systems for public access. Under New York law the cable operator operates the public access channels unless the local government chooses to do so or designates a private entity to do so.
New York City designated a private nonprofit, Manhattan Neighborhood Network (MNN), to operate the public access channels in Manhattan. MNN suspended two producers from its facilities and services after MNN ran a film they produced about MNN’s alleged neglect of the East Harlem community. The producers claimed MNN violated their First Amendment free speech rights when it “restricted their access to the public access channels because of the content of their film.”
Does one branch of a state legislature have “standing” to litigate a redistricting case? Not unless state law says so the Supreme Court ruled.
More technically, in Virginia House of Delegates v. Golden Bethune-Hill, the Supreme Court held 5-4 that the Virginia House of Delegates lacks standing to appeal a ruling striking down Virginia’s redistricting plan because Virginia law does not allow it to displace the Attorney General and it is only a single chamber of a bicameral legislature.