President-elect Donald Trump has vowed to get rid of numerous federal regulations adopted by the Obama Administration. Impossible many say. If there is one man who may be able to make this happen it is Supreme Court Justice Anthony Kennedy.

Three of the most important regulations to state and local government were the subject of litigation likely headed to the Supreme Court before Trump was elected:  the Clean Power Plan (CPP) (President Obama’s signature climate change measure), the regulations defining “waters of the...

President-elect Donald Trump has stated repeatedly that one of the goals of his new administration is to get rid of federal regulations. Despite the fact that the new administration has a menu of options to kill final federal regulations the most effective options are likely the most difficult to achieve.

This blog posting uses as examples three of the most important regulations to state and local government—all of which are on the chopping block:  the Clean Power Plan (CPP) (President Obama’s signature climate change measure), the regulations defining “waters of the United States” (WOTUS) (a significant term in the Clean Water Act defining the federal government’s jurisdiction to regulate water), and the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) overtime regulations (extending overtime pay to 4 million workers).

The question the Supreme Court will decide in Expressions Hair Design v. Schneiderman is whether state “no-surcharge” laws that prohibit vendors from charging more to credit-card customers but allows them to charge less to cash customers violate the First Amendment. The State and Local Legal Center (SLLC) amicus brief argues these laws don’t violate the First Amendment because they regulate conduct rather than speech.

Per a “no-surcharge” law if the regular price of an item is $100 credit-card customers may not be charged $103 and cash customers $100. But if the regular price is $103 credit-card customers may be charged $103 and cash customers $100.   

The Supreme Court refused to hear a case involving the question of whether a Colorado law requiring remote sellers to inform Colorado purchasers annually of their purchases and send the same information to the Colorado Department of Revenue is unconstitutional. As is always the case, the Supreme Court gave no reason for denying the petition.   

In Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, decided in 1992, the Supreme Court held that states cannot require retailers with no in-state physical presence to collect sales tax. In 2010 the Colorado legislature passed the law described above to improve sales tax collection. The Direct Marketing Association sued Colorado claiming the law unconstitutionally discriminates against interstate commerce and is unconstitutional under Quill.   

WHEREAS, the peaceful transition of knowledge and power from one president to another is a hallmark of American democracy; and

WHEREAS, the administration, Congress, and others should work actively with the states to ensure that the Presidential transition is efficient and worthy of the American people; and

Every time a federal agency thinks the scope of a preemption clause in federal law is too narrow may it just write a regulation expanding it? That is the heart of the matter in Coventry Health Care of Missouri v. Nevils.

The question of most interest to state and local governments in this case, more technically, is whether Chevron deference applies to an agency’s regulation construing the scope of a statute’s express-preemption provision.

The question in Kindred Nursing Centers v. Clark is whether the Federal Arbitration Act preempts Kentucky’s rule that an “attorney-in-fact” may bind a principal to an arbitration agreement only if the power-of attorney document expressly refers to arbitration agreements.

A number of parents executed power-of-attorney documents designating one of their children “attorney-in-fact.” While some of these documents gave the children broad rights to act on their parent’s behalf (“to do and perform for me in my name all that I might if present”), none explicitly gave their children the authority to agree to arbitration (rather than a jury trial) to resolve disputes regarding their parent’s legal rights.

In Texas, state law requires most people under age 25 to attend a state-licensed private driver education school to obtain a driver’s license. None of the schools accommodate deaf students. So a number of deaf students sued the Texas Education Agency (TEA) arguing it was required to bring the driver education schools into compliance with the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA).    

In Ivy v. Morath the Supreme Court was supposed to decide when state and local governments are responsible for ensuring that a private actor complies with the ADA. The Court dismissed the case concluding it was moot most likely because Texas claimed that four of the students suing completed the driver education course and one moved out of state.

G.G. is biologically female but identifies as a male. The Gloucester County School Board prevented him from using the boy’s bathroom. He sued the district arguing that is discriminated against him in violation of Title IX.

The facts of Gloucester County School Board v. G.G. could not be simpler. But the legal issue is complicated.

The Supreme Court will decide in Nelson v. Colorado whether it violates due process to require criminal defendants whose convictions have been reversed to prove their innocence by clear and convincing evidence to receive refunds of monetary penalties they have paid.  

Shannon Nelson was convicted of five charges relating to sexually assaulting her children. She was ordered to pay a variety of costs and fees. The appeals court overturned her conviction because the trial court allowed a lay witness to testify about the age at which children have the ability to remember information and relate it accurately. A new jury acquitted her.

She asked the trial court to refund the money she paid in costs and fees. It refused ruling that the legislature has not given it authority to issue refunds.

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