

# Migration Slowdown in America: Trends and Impacts\*

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*While much attention has been given to the overall decline of migration in the United States, its impact was strongest on particular regions, states, metropolitan areas, cities and suburbs. Shedding further light on the nature of the recent migration slowdown, this report details how different types of households and parts of the country have been affected and provides some insights on what may happen if and when migration again heats up.*

## Introduction

America has always been known as one of the most mobile countries in the world. Historically, Americans' pioneering spirit has led their migration westward; from the rural South to the industrial North; into the suburbs; to the Sun Belt; and most recently to interior frontiers in the Intermountain West and Southeast. Today, Americans' migration rates remain higher than those of most developed countries.<sup>1</sup>

But recent events have challenged that narrative, as migration in America slowed considerably. The trend relates to several factors. First, in many parts of the country, including large parts of Florida, Nevada and Arizona, a housing "bubble" arose during the middle part of the decade due to overbuilding and easy mortgage credit. Second, the financial market crisis that began in September 2008 led to sharp reductions in credit. As a result, potential buyers had difficulty obtaining mortgages and potential sellers saw reductions in the values of their homes. Third, the financial crisis greatly exacerbated the national recession that had begun in December 2007, reducing job availability in most regions of the country. This triple whammy of forces made it riskier for would-be homebuyers to find financing, would-be sellers to receive good value for their home and potential long-distance movers to find employment in areas where jobs were previously plentiful.

## Methodology

### Data and Measures

This report utilizes the most recent government statistics on domestic and international migration. Three of the data sources used are produced by the U.S. Census Bureau: the Annual Social and Economic (ASEC) Supplement to the Current Population Survey; the American Community Survey; and the Population Estimates Program. A further source is the annual state-to-state migration flow data provided by the Internal Revenue Service.<sup>2</sup>

Each covers moves over one-year periods, with end points ranging from 2008 to early 2009.

- *Current Population Survey (CPS).* The migration data for this report uses the "residence one year ago" question from the Annual Social and Economic Supplement of the CPS, drawn from approximately 100,000 households representing the civilian non-institutionalized population of the United States in March of each year. The most recent data in this report pertains to the period between March 2008 and March 2009.
- *American Community Survey (ACS).* The American Community Survey provides information on migration for a sample large enough to examine social and demographic attributes for migrants into and out of states and other large geographic areas. This report uses ACS data to compare the social and demographic attributes of net migration for 2004–05 with 2007–08.
- *Population Estimates.* The Census Bureau's Population Estimates program provides information on net domestic migration and net international migration for lower levels of geography (states, metropolitan areas and counties) than are available with either the CPS or single-year ACS data. The estimates are not based directly on surveys but on models and administrative data.
- *IRS State-to-State Migration.* Annual state-to-state domestic migration flows are available from the Internal Revenue Service Statistics of Income Division, based on a comparison of tax filer addresses in consecutive years. Estimates of migration flows are based on the number of exemptions claimed by tax filers, which provide a proxy for persons in their families. The data include only those who filed taxes in successive years, and therefore omit some elderly individuals who do not file tax returns and new filers who did not file in the previous year.

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### Geography

This report presents migration statistics for states, the four Census regions (Northeast, Midwest, South, and West), large metropolitan areas, and selected urban counties. (See Tables B and C for 2000–01 to 2007–08 net migration statistics for all U.S. states and the 25 largest metropolitan areas.) Metropolitan areas are defined according to Office of Management and Budget guidance issued in November 2008.

### Findings


#### A. In 2007–2008, the overall U.S. migration rate reached its lowest point since World War II.

The past two years marked the least mobile period in postwar American society. In 2007–08, only 11.9 percent of Americans changed residences, and this rose to just 12.5 percent in 2008–09. Together,

these are the lowest rates of annual mobility since migration statistics were collected in 1947–48 (Figure A). The rates are down from 13 to 14 percent earlier this decade, and even more so from the 16 to 17 percent rates that prevailed in the 1990s. Back in the 1950s, almost one-fifth of all Americans changed residences annually. Since then, the American public has become somewhat more rooted due to higher rates of homeownership and the aging of the baby boom generation.

Declines in both long-distance and short-distance migration contributed to this historic U.S. migration slowdown. Long-distance migrants move among broader geographies, such as metropolitan areas or states. For people of working age, these moves tend to be associated with changes in employment. In contrast, local or short-distance migration, sometimes called residential mobility, often accompanies a change in housing needs. This might include a move from renting to owning a

**Figure A: Annual Domestic Migration Rate, United States, 1947–48 to 2008–09**



Note: Annual data not collected from 1971–75 and 1976–80.  
Source: Brookings analysis of Current Population Survey data.

home, to a different kind of house or neighborhood, or changes in family status such as getting married or having children.<sup>3</sup> Roughly three in five moves are short-distance moves; one in five is a long-distance move; and the remaining one in five is an inter-county, within-state move.

The rate at which people move within a county, a proxy for short-distance migration, reached 7.8 percent of the population in 2007–08, the lowest rate since the end of World War II. It ticked up in 2008–09 to 8.4 percent, though it remains low by historical standards (Figure B). In much of the 1990s, greater than 10 percent of the population moved within county lines, as did well over 13 percent of Americans for much of the 1950s and 1960s. Residential mobility has declined gradually as homeownership rates have risen and the population has aged, but the sharp downturn in the past two years relates very much to the housing market meltdown.


At the other end of the spectrum, the rate at which people move across state lines can serve as a proxy for long-distance migration. In both 2007–08 and 2008–09, annual interstate migration reached its lowest rates since the end of

World War II (Figure B). The recent decline in between-state migration is far more dramatic than that for within-county residential mobility. In fact, the 1.6 percent interstate migration rate for the past two years was half the value exhibited in 1999–2000, and far lower than the rate in the 1950s, when between 3 and 4 percent of the population moved across state lines annually.

As migration declined, housing became a notably less important driver for relocation. In 2004–05, amid the housing bubble period, 62 percent of within-county movers and 22 percent of interstate movers cited housing-related reasons as most important in explaining their move. By 2008–09, those shares had declined to 57 and 14 percent, respectively. Job-related reasons explained fully 46 percent of the fewer interstate moves undertaken in the latter period (see Table A for details).

Although short-distance moves are more frequent, long-distance migration acts as an engine of growth in many metropolitan areas. It affects not only the sizes of their overall populations but also those of key social and demographic segments that impact the economic vitality of these areas.

**Figure B: Within-County and Interstate Migration Rates, United States, 1990–91 to 2008–09**



Source: Brookings analysis of Current Population Survey data.

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The demographic attribute most related to migration is age; younger adults are far more likely to move than older individuals. Figure C indicates that in 2000–01, as in most years, individuals in their 20s showed the highest rate of interstate migration, a rate which tapered dramatically as individuals age into their late 30s and thereafter, with a small peak in the early 60s related to retirement moves. It was young adults—those with the highest rates of mobility—who showed the steepest declines in interstate migration by 2008–09, with rates almost halving for 20 to 29 year-olds. Youth migration rates appear to have fallen in response to both a weakened job market and reduced home buying activity. Even the small bump in migration for seniors at retirement age disappeared in 2008–09.

Other demographic and economic attributes are associated with migration as well (Figure D). For instance, the most educated segments of the

population are more likely to make long-distance moves, largely because college graduates and professionals operate in more of a national labor market, attuned to opportunities in different regions of the country. Less-educated workers are more likely to change jobs within a labor market and thus make shorter-distance moves.<sup>4</sup> These differences have persisted during the migration slowdown, though all groups have been affected. Those with at least a college degree had higher rates of interstate mobility than other groups in 2008–09. Yet each educational group experienced at least a 1 percentage point decline in its rates over the course of the decade.

Married couples, (generally older) widows, and widowers generally exhibit lower levels of interstate migration than single and divorced persons, and this remained true in 2008–09. Single individuals by virtue of their relative youth and lack of dependents may be the most “footloose” of

**Table A: Reasons for Moving: Total, Within County, and Between States, 2004–05 and 2008–09**

Reasons	Total moves*		Within county		Between states	
	2004–05	2008–09	2004–05	2008–09	2004–05	2008–09
<b>Housing related</b>	47.1	45.8	61.8	57.2	22.4	13.7
Wanted to own home, not rent	9.3	5.5	12.2	6.6	4.0	1.5
Wanted new or better housing	17.8	14.5	24.4	18.6	7.3	2.5
Wanted better neighborhood	4.0	5.0	4.8	6.2	2.0	1.6
For cheaper housing	6.6	11.1	8.7	13.9	3.5	3.9
Other housing reason	9.4	9.7	11.7	11.9	5.6	4.2
<b>Job related</b>	17.6	17.8	6.7	8.9	34.0	46.1
New job or job transfer	10.4	8.7	2.3	2.1	25.5	33.2
To look for work or lost job	1.9	2.7	0.5	1.0	3.0	7.3
For easier commute	3.4	5.0	3.3	5.0	1.6	1.9
Retired	0.5	0.4	0.2	0.2	1.4	1.2
Other job-related reason	1.4	1.0	0.4	0.6	2.5	2.5
<b>Family related</b>	27.1	26.4	26.3	26.6	30.4	25.4
Change in marital status	7.1	5.4	7.0	5.5	6.7	3.7
To establish own household	7.8	9.5	9.5	11.6	5.0	2.7
Other family reason	12.2	11.5	9.8	9.5	18.7	19.0
<b>Other</b>	8.2	10.0	5.2	7.3	13.2	14.8
Attend/leave college	3.2	2.6	1.8	1.5	5.3	3.6
Change of climate	0.6	0.5	0.2	0.1	2.3	2.6
Health reasons	1.6	1.6	1.4	1.4	2.4	1.8
Other reasons	2.8	4.9	1.8	3.8	3.2	6.8
Natural disaster	0.0	0.4	0.0	0.5	0.0	0.0
<b>Total</b>	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Source: Brookings analysis of Current Population Survey data.

\*Includes movement within county, between counties but within state, between states, and from abroad.

marital status groups. However, those individuals experienced the most substantial decline in long-distance migration, perhaps deciding to live with parents or other friends and relatives as a result of the economic downturn and not making as many long-distance labor-market-related moves.

Finally, economic attributes such as employment status and homeownership also relate to migration, with the unemployed and renters typically undertaking long-distance moves more frequently. Both employed and unemployed interstate migration rates dropped significantly during the decade. Renters, meanwhile, showed a much more substantial fall-off in long-distance migration than their homeowner counterparts, perhaps reflecting their own worsened economic prospects, but also the reluctance of owners to sell their homes and move during a period of nationwide home price declines.<sup>5</sup>

Overall, the last few years brought a sharp decline in migration, particularly over long distances. A freeze in the housing market coupled with a fairly pervasive nationwide recession led to a sharp and historic decline in long-distance migration that has deeply affected more economically vulnerable members of society.


**B. From 2007 to 2008, 23 states, mostly in the Intermountain West and Southeast, showed reduced in-migration or a switch from in- to out-migration.**

The recent downturn in interstate migration has had variable impacts on different parts of the country. States that grew fastest during the mid-decade “bubble” years have experienced the greatest downturns in recent in-migration. By the same token, several states that were considered unaffordable and exported migrants during those bubble years have seen out-migration decline considerably.

State-level migration patterns between 2006–07 and 2007–08 demonstrate the impacts of the downturn on different types of states (Map A). The greatest shifts occurred in states that had benefitted most from the mid-decade housing boom, especially the southern state of Florida and the Intermountain West states of Arizona and Nevada. Among the 28 states that gained migrants in 2006–07, 19 gained fewer in 2007–08, and an additional four, including Florida, flipped from gaining to losing domestic migrants.

Many of these high-cost coastal states lost migrants during the middle part of the decade to

**Figure C: Interstate Migration Rate by Age, United States, 2000–01 and 2008–09**



Source: Brookings analysis of Current Population Survey data.

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interior states where housing seemed more affordable. In 2004–05, California and New York each lost about a quarter million migrants to other parts of the country. As more Americans stayed put in 2007–08, California’s migration loss shrank to 144,000 and New York’s roughly halved to 126,000. A similar retention of potential out-migrants occurred in Massachusetts, New Jersey and Connecticut, as evidently many young couples, empty nesters and retirees waited until new opportunities arose elsewhere.


During much of the post-World War II period, when Northerners contemplated moving to the Sun Belt, three states tended to stand out—Florida for Easterners; Texas for Midwesterners and California for people from all parts of the country. Florida and Texas kept their luster in attracting migrants up through the first decade of

this century (Table F). California began to lose its magnetism for domestic migrants during the 1990s, first due to a sharp economic downturn and later to high housing costs. The recent migration downturn has impacted each of these states somewhat differently.


### Florida

Florida, of the three, is a poster child for the recent housing slump. Long a magnet for retirees and more recently for broader segments of the population, Florida led the nation in domestic migration for the first half of this decade. Yet overbuilding and a high level of foreclosures made it one of the first states to show dramatic declines in migration, including a surprising switch from net in- to net out-migration between 2006–07 and 2007–08. This devastated the state’s economy, which had

**Figure D: Interstate Migration Rate by Demographic/Economic Attributes, United States, 2000–2001 to 2008–09**



Source: Brookings analysis of Current Population Survey data.



relied heavily on the construction and real estate industries.<sup>6</sup>

The major contributor to Florida's migration loss was its exchange with the Northeast (Figure F). In-migration from that region and especially from New York and its metropolitan areas, dominated that from other regions through 2005, then fell precipitously through 2008. Meanwhile, Florida began to export migrants on net to other parts of the South by 2005–06, a pattern that accelerated the following year. Major migration gainers from Florida include Georgia, North Carolina, Tennessee and Texas. (See Table C for the top and bottom five state contributors to Florida's migration.)

The shift from net in-migration to net out-migration in Florida was especially strong for whites, Hispanics, younger people, married couples and persons with some college education (Table D). Despite its total net out-migration, Florida still attracted people aged 55 and over in 2008–09. Of course, the considerable reduction in the in-migration of younger age groups stands to rob Florida of some of its traditionally vibrant, youthful, middle-class labor force.

### **Texas**

Texas provides a sharp contrast to Florida. It is part of an economically different Sun Belt than Florida, one largely insulated from the mortgage

crisis, steep home price declines and employment losses.<sup>7</sup> Texas' more diverse economy and stricter home mortgage regulation (which itself resulted from excesses of the previous decade) have produced far fewer job losses and foreclosures than Florida, Arizona and Nevada.<sup>8</sup>

As a result, Texas' migration patterns differ sharply from Florida's and California's (Figure E). Buffeted to some degree by in-migration from post-Katrina New Orleans, the state has shown consistent net in-migration over the past few years (Figure F). From 2004 to 2008, aside from Louisiana (where gains were strong post-Katrina but short-lived), California and Florida contributed the most migrants to Texas, while smaller but significant gains came from Illinois and New York.

A broad array of demographic groups, including whites, Hispanics, children and younger married couples drove Texas' recent migration gains (Table D). Its reduced black in-migration can be attributed, in part, to Katrina-related return migration to Louisiana. Notably, Texas displayed heightened attraction for college graduates in 2008–09 compared with 2004–05, which could benefit the state economically over the long run.

### **California**

The third traditional Sun Belt state, California, continues to show net domestic out-migration,

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**Table B: Net Domestic Migration and International Migration, Large Metro Areas by Region, 2000 to 2008\***

Region/ metro area**	2008 population (1,000s)	Annual domestic migration								2000–08 Total	
		2000–01	2001–02	2002–03	2003–04	2004–05	2005–06	2006–07	2007–08	Domestic migration	International migration
<b>North</b>											
New York.....	19,007	-176,418	-207,800	-236,767	-248,028	-284,253	-273,991	-219,104	-144,099	-1,790,460	1,102,658
Philadelphia.....	5,838	-14,758	-7,821	-7,039	-8,118	-13,995	-16,119	-18,598	-21,848	-108,296	95,882
Boston.....	4,523	-13,945	-35,445	-47,036	-46,821	-46,088	-32,988	-22,508	-8,261	-253,092	165,260
Pittsburgh.....	2,351	-8,085	-5,404	-4,654	-8,698	-11,148	-9,860	-5,062	-2,432	-55,343	15,576
Providence.....	1,597	3,047	5,679	3,428	-7,485	-13,530	-14,282	-13,766	-10,626	-47,535	29,689
<b>Midwest</b>											
Chicago.....	9,570	-55,164	-68,856	-72,424	-65,555	-77,736	-69,542	-55,355	-42,110	-506,742	385,958
Detroit.....	4,425	-25,209	-33,974	-30,532	-31,013	-38,727	-46,477	-59,081	-62,160	-327,173	91,394
Minn-St.Paul.....	3,230	7,571	-4,601	-9,151	-4,184	-7,224	-2,764	-1,965	-3,440	-25,758	72,601
St. Louis.....	2,817	-4,420	-4,495	-2,145	-4,724	-7,880	-3,670	-6,901	-5,567	-39,802	26,547
Cincinnati.....	2,155	-1,560	-4,901	-3,657	-2,075	-1,837	-680	-1,354	-3,569	-19,633	17,287
Cleveland.....	2,088	-14,943	-13,586	-13,684	-14,597	-17,697	-20,487	-16,829	-14,896	-126,719	25,432
Kansas City.....	2,002	4,294	5,848	196	1,047	1,401	3,798	4,529	1,413	22,526	28,730
Columbus.....	1,773	5,670	430	3,333	2,288	2,672	3,473	3,222	2,499	23,587	30,262
Indianapolis.....	1,715	9,196	6,437	6,026	7,102	7,720	10,113	8,815	6,707	62,116	20,679
Milwaukee.....	1,549	-8,619	-7,139	-7,866	-10,040	-12,903	-11,551	-7,844	-6,443	-72,405	23,709
<b>South</b>											
Dallas.....	6,300	48,552	13,919	-1,303	8,504	23,455	71,433	52,260	43,175	259,995	293,077
Houston.....	5,728	4,570	24,498	2,895	6,427	6,187	88,885	19,981	36,724	190,167	266,850
Miami.....	5,415	-3,665	-1,766	-20,134	-3,199	-9,923	-50,595	-84,268	-46,997	-220,547	423,136
Atlanta.....	5,376	47,792	26,219	22,507	32,297	51,462	95,661	75,098	43,051	394,087	181,920
Washington, D.C.....	5,358	15,922	1,296	-8,500	-14,535	-16,790	-45,148	-35,337	-18,259	-121,351	245,228
Tampa.....	2,734	30,512	34,285	32,262	49,427	52,008	39,331	16,117	6,510	260,452	59,852
Baltimore.....	2,667	-235	4,108	3,556	-6,434	-5,883	-6,573	-11,158	-12,352	-34,971	31,238
Orlando.....	2,055	30,423	27,098	27,184	44,365	51,939	34,307	11,570	3,153	230,039	72,270
San Antonio.....	2,031	5,651	16,252	16,578	15,025	15,605	31,421	30,910	22,791	154,233	28,977
Charlotte.....	1,702	17,355	14,067	13,749	18,992	31,342	43,295	45,549	34,387	218,736	42,720
Virginia Beach.....	1,658	-4,711	12,208	22,181	332	-4,659	-3,727	-14,556	-15,523	-8,455	-2,681
Austin.....	1,653	34,655	4,780	6,916	14,624	22,537	38,918	40,561	35,041	198,032	59,259
Nashville.....	1,551	8,171	4,164	7,332	13,458	16,605	22,834	20,638	16,625	109,827	25,388
Jacksonville.....	1,313	14,164	17,992	17,543	19,733	17,781	18,753	11,405	4,768	122,139	11,101
<b>West</b>											
Los Angeles.....	12,873	-104,034	-109,505	-119,876	-140,949	-200,728	-227,993	-221,144	-115,037	-1,239,266	815,517
Phoenix.....	4,282	49,818	49,846	44,673	66,231	98,699	102,954	65,949	51,077	529,247	168,765
San Francisco.....	4,275	-24,917	-79,116	-74,174	-64,659	-51,236	-40,504	-20,536	5,506	-349,636	249,902
Riverside.....	4,116	57,212	66,484	85,910	95,221	72,502	61,177	29,715	-7,608	460,613	96,382
Seattle.....	3,345	4,962	-7,177	-12,931	-10,269	5,125	21,252	10,281	11,869	23,112	103,670
San Diego.....	3,001	6,446	3,674	1,133	-38,101	-36,060	-35,785	-15,553	420	-113,826	98,650
Denver.....	2,507	16,883	-5,212	-12,539	-7,127	-429	10,161	15,772	17,872	35,381	93,190
Portland.....	2,207	17,123	14,485	4,025	485	12,335	18,366	17,101	17,996	101,916	68,655
Sacramento.....	2,110	37,274	35,844	25,874	18,293	4,757	1,779	3,757	4,524	132,102	63,544
Las Vegas.....	1,866	41,311	37,491	35,714	53,848	39,186	44,436	32,876	14,365	299,227	65,758
San Jose.....	1,819	-36,884	-58,476	-44,179	-33,479	-22,154	-17,797	-11,903	-2,625	-227,497	162,882

Source: Brookings analysis of U.S. Census Bureau Population Estimates Program data.

\*Forty largest metro areas based on 2008 population estimates.

\*\*Official name as defined by the Office of Management and Budget is abbreviated.

which began in the 1990s (Figure E). A significant portion of that population loss has been attributed to the high cost of living in coastal California, which tended to spread migrants to other nearby states—Nevada, Arizona, Oregon and Washington—as well as to other parts of the Intermountain West and Texas.<sup>9</sup>


While Florida attracted many more domestic in-migrants during the mid-decade housing bubble, California showed accelerated out-migration

during those years. As the bubble began to burst, domestic out-migration from California slowed considerably. Migration away from areas stretching from San Francisco to San Diego, where high housing prices fueled “middle class flight” to the interior West, has now retrenched as home foreclosures rise and job opportunities diminish in Nevada and Arizona.

Those Western states very much drive California’s overall migration trend (Figure F). The




**Figure F: Contribution to Net Domestic Migration by Region for Florida, Texas, and California, 2000–01 to 2007–08**



Source: Brookings analysis of Internal Revenue Service Migration Flow data.

**Figure E: Net Domestic Migration, Florida, Texas, and California, 2000–01 to 2007–08**



Source: Brookings analysis of U.S. Census Bureau Population Estimates Program data.

lion’s share of domestic net out-migration was absorbed by other Western states during the first half of the decade, but between 2006 and 2008, the annual losses dropped by roughly half. Among these states, California lost the most migrants to Arizona and Nevada during the “bubble” year of 2004–05. Now, Texas absorbs the greatest number of California out-migrants. In 2007–08, California experienced net out-migration to 36 states and the District of Columbia, and received small net migration gains from Northeastern and Midwestern states including New York, Massachusetts, New Jersey and Michigan (Table C).

During the middle part of the decade, younger couples and singles with moderate education levels dominated the groups leaving California for lower-cost housing and job opportunities (Table D). Now, the state seems to be retaining many of these same groups, particularly younger whites and Hispanics who are married couples or singles, as housing cost pressures ease. Among educational groups, college graduates flipped

from considerable net out-migration to modest net in-migration, as the housing market and job opportunities dried up in other parts of the country. For the moment, the national migration slowdown appears to have benefited California, as more of its younger, well-educated residents have remained.

**C. The metro areas that experienced the greatest recent migration declines were those that reaped the most migrants during the mid-decade housing bubble.**

Metropolitan areas provide a sharper contrast between the “winners” and “losers” in the recent migration slowdown. For example, the Riverside metropolitan area in southern California experienced a housing bubble similar to those in Las Vegas and Phoenix, and migration trends there have differed from those occurring in coastal California metropolitan areas.

Several metropolitan areas that gained substantial numbers of in-migrants during the hous-

**Table C: Top Five Sources and Destinations for Net Domestic Migration, Selected States, 2004–05 to 2007–08, continued on next page**

States/sources or destinations	Contributions to net domestic migration					Total 2003–08
	2003–04	2004–05	2005–06	2006–07	2007–08	
<b>Florida</b>						
<b>Sources</b>						
New York .....	53,145	62,600	52,073	32,800	18,018	218,636
New Jersey .....	23,841	27,300	23,563	16,639	11,236	102,579
Massachusetts .....	15,902	16,838	13,117	8,072	3,931	57,860
Michigan .....	9,036	10,020	10,521	10,205	8,286	48,068
Pennsylvania .....	11,960	13,400	10,197	6,629	4,626	46,812
<b>Destinations</b>						
Georgia .....	1,098	-3,008	-15,828	-27,487	-19,995	-65,220
North Carolina .....	-269	-2,703	-11,398	-17,573	-15,804	-47,747
Tennessee .....	-340	-4,045	-9,679	-12,691	-10,479	-37,234
Texas .....	2,967	1,672	-6,232	-13,293	-15,142	-30,028
South Carolina .....	583	-524	-4,734	-7,081	-6,403	-18,159
<b>Texas</b>						
<b>Sources</b>						
California .....	11,990	23,270	41,164	50,647	32,406	159,477
Louisiana .....	3,576	5,617	79,791	-6,708	-192	82,084
Florida .....	-2,967	-1,672	6,232	13,293	15,142	30,028
Illinois .....	4,172	4,753	5,676	6,257	6,675	27,533
New York .....	3,015	3,782	5,179	5,799	5,218	22,993
<b>Destinations</b>						
Arkansas .....	-933	-1,559	-622	698	1,628	-788
District of Columbia .....	-164	-110	-168	-145	56	-531
Montana .....	-242	175	-78	-126	30	-241
<b>California</b>						
<b>Sources</b>						
New York .....	2,641	3,842	3,779	3,467	3,303	17,032
New Jersey .....	2,193	2,762	3,041	2,557	2,988	13,541
Massachusetts .....	2,404	2,663	3,062	2,846	2,498	13,473
Michigan .....	1,418	1,237	2,226	2,931	4,218	12,030
Illinois .....	2,744	1,287	1,415	1,172	2,298	8,916
<b>Destinations</b>						
Arizona .....	-24,620	-45,265	-49,026	-31,408	-15,533	-165,852
Texas .....	-11,990	-23,270	-41,164	-50,647	-32,406	-159,477
Nevada .....	-30,374	-31,610	-30,925	-24,743	-12,094	-129,746
Oregon .....	-11,072	-18,159	-21,667	-16,549	-12,577	-80,024
Washington .....	-7,554	-14,211	-16,986	-13,099	-11,890	-63,740
<b>New York</b>						
<b>Sources</b>						
Michigan .....	13	68	648	1,044	1,331	3,104
Massachusetts .....	693	71	12	-446	-152	178
North Dakota .....	2	53	34	-31	29	87
<b>Destinations</b>						
Florida .....	-53,145	-62,600	-52,073	-32,800	-18,018	-218,636
New Jersey .....	-26,488	-26,923	-24,144	-18,529	-15,737	-111,821
North Carolina .....	-10,273	-14,418	-16,968	-17,862	-15,970	-75,491
Pennsylvania .....	-15,115	-15,437	-15,613	-12,094	-7,759	-66,018
Georgia .....	-8,692	-10,648	-12,681	-12,742	-8,904	-53,667

Source: Brookings analysis of Internal Revenue Service Migration Flow data.

ing bubble years seem to have lost their attractive power (Table E). In both 2003–04 and 2004–05, Riverside, Phoenix, Las Vegas, Tampa, Orlando and Atlanta led all metropolitan areas in net domestic migration. By 2005–06, Tampa and Orlando had already dropped to eighth and ninth as Florida's housing bubble began to burst, while Riverside fell but remained in the top six. But by 2007–08, Riverside had turned from a domestic migration gainer to one of the biggest losers (ranked 350 out

of 363); Tampa and Orlando plummeted further down the list; and Las Vegas dropped to 13th.

As migration to Florida and the Intermountain West waned in the wake of the mortgage crisis, other metro areas climbed the list of top gainers. Chief among these were metro areas in Texas. Yet recent migration gains among the top-ranked metro areas were not nearly as high as those in the middle of the decade. Phoenix continued to lead all other metro areas in domestic migration in 2007–

**DEMOGRAPHICS**

**Table C: Top Five Sources and Destinations for Net Domestic Migration, Selected States, 2004–05 to 2007–08, continued**

<i>States/sources or destinations</i>	<i>Contributions to net domestic migration</i>					<i>Total</i>
	<i>2003–04</i>	<i>2004–05</i>	<i>2005–06</i>	<i>2006–07</i>	<i>2007–08</i>	<i>2003–08</i>
<b>Arizona</b>						
<b>Sources</b>						
California.....	24,620	45,265	49,026	31,408	15,533	165,852
Illinois.....	5,138	5,430	5,261	3,616	3,224	22,669
Michigan.....	2,347	2,922	3,757	4,674	5,096	18,796
New York.....	3,067	3,532	3,992	3,221	2,121	15,933
Ohio.....	2,008	2,274	2,855	2,581	2,197	11,915
<b>Destinations</b>						
Texas.....	1,621	2,016	-565	-3,536	-3,524	-3,988
Idaho.....	129	-390	-631	-914	-739	-2,545
Arkansas.....	-145	-140	-360	-309	-323	-1,277
North Carolina.....	322	136	-523	-622	-562	-1,249
Tennessee.....	-48	-169	-325	-396	74	-864
<b>Nevada</b>						
<b>Sources</b>						
California.....	30,374	31,610	30,925	24,743	12,094	129,746
New York.....	2,330	2,624	2,344	1,738	1,243	10,279
Illinois.....	2,261	2,010	2,059	1,277	1,051	8,658
Michigan.....	896	985	1,534	2,031	2,382	7,828
Hawaii.....	981	1,355	1,288	1,821	1,066	6,511
<b>Destinations</b>						
Arizona.....	-307	-2,224	-2,136	-965	-733	-6,365
Idaho.....	-194	-720	-1,207	-1,011	-902	-4,034
Texas.....	729	74	-767	-1,412	-1,754	-3,130
Utah.....	1,381	-413	-875	-1,323	-1,768	-2,998
Oregon.....	681	-254	-588	-633	-687	-1,481

Source: Brookings analysis of Internal Revenue Service Migration Flow data.

**Table D: Net Domestic Migration by Demographic Characteristics, Florida, Texas and California, 2004–05 to 2007–08**

	<i>Florida</i>		<i>Texas</i>		<i>California</i>	
	<i>2004–05</i>	<i>2007–08</i>	<i>2004–05</i>	<i>2007–08</i>	<i>2004–05</i>	<i>2007–08</i>
<b>Race/Ethnicity</b>						
White	112,217	-7,790	54,624	66,162	-160,452	-65,340
Black	13,593	9,462	49,252	17,252	-21,648	-13,063
Hispanic	45,178	-13,375	8,292	33,882	-91,423	-45,007
Asian	9,908	-1,715	4,649	10,103	-4,232	3,957
<b>Age</b>						
Under 15	24,488	-8,380	33,938	49,675	-88,709	-39,285
15–24	23,477	-8,727	12,775	10,104	-11,753	-2,770
25–34	22,428	-19,948	20,887	37,123	-44,598	-22,716
35–44	21,395	-2,227	13,367	19,456	-54,905	-20,927
45–54	27,298	264	11,965	4,970	-30,277	-12,783
55–64	41,784	14,306	7,003	2,111	-28,416	-10,891
65–	16,209	8,766	12,721	6,460	-22,315	-8,121
<b>Educational Attainment</b>						
Less than HS	15,584	3,649	8,698	12,365	-27,272	-16,335
HS Grad	37,741	4,760	18,269	11,678	-53,144	-20,699
Some College	35,745	-9,449	29,726	25,927	-59,052	-42,641
College Grad	40,044	2,201	9,250	20,150	-41,043	4,237
<b>Marital Status</b>						
Never married	49,982	-4,821	18,116	23,265	-22,631	-18,417
Currently married	94,780	-551	43,607	48,795	-131,581	-45,790
Divorced/Separated	13,923	3,498	17,434	8,990	-38,002	-16,689
Widowed	202	-4,947	3,288	2,769	-9,193	-2,626

Source: Brookings analysis of American Community Survey data.

**Table E: Metro Areas with Highest Annual Net Domestic Migration, 2003–04 to 2007–08\***

2003–04		2004–05		2005–06		2006–07		2007–08	
<b>1</b> Riverside	95,221	<b>1</b> Phoenix	98,699	<b>1</b> Phoenix	102,954	<b>1</b> Atlanta	75,098	<b>1</b> Phoenix	51,077
<b>2</b> Phoenix	66,231	<b>2</b> Riverside	72,502	<b>2</b> Atlanta	95,661	<b>2</b> Phoenix	65,949	2 Dallas	43,175
<b>3</b> Las Vegas	53,848	<b>3</b> Tampa	52,008	3 Houston	88,885	3 Dallas	52,260	<b>3</b> Atlanta	43,051
<b>4</b> Tampa	49,427	<b>4</b> Orlando	51,939	4 Dallas	71,433	4 Charlotte	45,549	4 Houston	36,724
<b>5</b> Orlando	44,365	<b>5</b> Atlanta	51,462	<b>5</b> Riverside	61,177	5 Austin	40,561	5 Austin	35,041
<b>6</b> Atlanta	32,297	<b>6</b> Las Vegas	39,186	<b>6</b> Las Vegas	44,436	6 New Orleans	36,155	6 Charlotte	34,387
				<b>8</b> Tampa	39,331	<b>7</b> Las Vegas	32,876	<b>13</b> Las Vegas	14,365
				<b>10</b> Orlando	34,307	<b>10</b> Riverside	29,715	<b>25</b> Tampa	6,510
						<b>15</b> Tampa	16,117	<b>57</b> Orlando	3,153
						<b>19</b> Orlando	11,570	<b>350</b> Riverside	-7,608

Source: Brookings analysis of U.S. Census Bureau Population Estimates Program data.  
\*Bold denotes metro areas ranking one to six in 2003–04.

08, but its net annual inflow was only about half what it was just two years earlier. The same held for Atlanta, the second-largest gainer in 2007–08.

Large metro areas in Texas, including Dallas, Houston and Austin, exhibit an entirely different pattern. They experienced far greater net immigration in the latter years of this decade, at the same time that the migration bubble burst in Florida. Large gains in Houston, and to a lesser extent Dallas, in 2005–06 reflect in part temporary gains from Louisianans displaced by the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina. Even as interstate migration plummeted nationwide, the three metro areas each still managed to post net gains of between 35,000 and 45,000 migrants in 2007–08.

Coastal California metro areas display something of a mirror-image migration pattern. While the San Francisco Bay Area, San Diego and especially Los Angeles saw increasing out-migration through the middle part of the decade, that trend moderated along with home prices during the past few years. San Francisco and San Diego each posted small migration gains in 2007–08. Los Angeles lost only about half as many migrants that year as it did in 2005–06. Its pattern roughly inverts that of the Phoenix metro area, the destination for many Angelinos in the early to mid-2000s. Las Vegas and Riverside also received many of their migrants from coastal California during that earlier period, but have since seen inflows plummet.

As Map A demonstrates, the impact of the migration slowdown was hardly limited to these Sun Belt destinations (Figure G). The Boston and







Chicago metro areas shed increasing numbers of migrants through the middle part of the decade, but began to stanch the outflow in 2005–06. The same held for the New York area; while net out-migration reduced its population by 144,000 in 2007–08, that was only about half the migration loss it sustained just three years prior. Pittsburgh posted its smallest decline from net migration in more than a decade, while rising outflows from Buffalo, Cleveland and Providence moderated after peaking in 2005–06. The latter two metro areas have among the weakest regional economies in the United States today, however, and their migration fortunes may slip once again as long-distance household mobility begins to rise.<sup>10</sup>

**D. Although international migration to the U.S. has also declined, it continued to offset losses from domestic migration in many large metropolitan immigrant gateways.**

Recent data suggest that the size of the U.S. foreign-born population may have stood almost still between 2007 and 2008, after increasing by about 500,000 the prior year and by an average of 1 million annually between 1990 and 2006.<sup>11</sup> This is attributable in part to a slowdown in Mexican immigrants.<sup>12</sup>

Despite this reduced flow, immigration remained an important contributor to population gains in large metropolitan gateways, which retain a high concentration of the nation’s foreign born. From 2000 to 2008, 25 percent of all net immigrant gains occurred in the two largest metropolitan magnets, New York and Los Ange-

**Figure G: Net Domestic Migration, Selected Metro Areas by State/Region, 2000–01 to 2007–08**



Source: Brookings analysis of U.S. Census Bureau Population Estimates Program data.

**Table F: Net Domestic Migration and International Migration, U.S. States, 2000 to 2008**

State or other jurisdiction	Annual domestic migration								2000–08 Total	
	2000–01	2001–02	2002–03	2003–04	2004–05	2005–06	2006–07	2007–08	Domestic migration	International migration
Alabama.....	-8,850	-8,616	4,821	5,123	16,248	32,945	18,496	15,118	75,285	29,910
Alaska.....	-2,891	1,916	2,619	629	-868	-1,981	-3,909	-3,732	-8,217	3,947
Arizona.....	56,868	69,983	63,038	90,745	132,123	137,697	87,245	62,980	700,679	208,005
Arkansas.....	-318	341	5,175	10,961	15,405	21,361	7,946	6,934	67,805	26,388
California.....	-38,896	-114,576	-96,329	-161,077	-250,028	-285,494	-268,809	-144,061	-1,359,270	1,754,946
Colorado.....	44,912	14,441	-7,517	-3,332	8,600	31,864	33,021	36,878	158,867	137,152
Connecticut.....	-7,175	-2,754	47	-14,320	-17,357	-15,125	-24,218	-14,985	-95,887	99,037
Delaware.....	2,835	4,193	5,814	6,090	7,813	5,792	4,615	4,126	41,278	13,669
Florida.....	157,832	185,226	170,864	266,157	266,850	174,416	37,650	-9,286	1,249,709	668,040
Georgia.....	55,256	43,308	36,629	51,800	62,318	120,420	98,666	56,674	525,071	233,520
Hawaii.....	-6,518	-724	5,019	-1,972	1,058	-3,461	-11,849	-3,752	-22,199	29,355
Idaho.....	7,422	6,847	9,068	13,170	20,215	22,049	19,975	12,767	111,513	17,142
Illinois.....	-69,865	-79,082	-78,604	-72,343	-85,236	-72,434	-56,984	-52,349	-566,897	409,865
Indiana.....	-6,499	-13,033	-2,231	-4,363	3,423	6,530	628	-1,979	-17,524	68,416
Iowa.....	-13,271	-13,252	-8,497	-3,840	-5,533	-598	-2,491	411	-47,071	35,444
Kansas.....	-13,837	-9,577	-9,750	-11,929	-10,937	-6,743	-3,280	284	-65,769	44,788
Kentucky.....	-1,329	4,543	10,926	5,941	13,606	10,464	17,044	11,828	73,023	29,943
Louisiana.....	-33,945	-18,993	-10,584	-9,846	-14,335	-271,330	27,500	13,555	-317,978	22,128
Maine.....	6,260	8,664	9,194	3,711	2,586	395	-963	-2,063	27,784	5,142
Maryland.....	8,893	12,872	7,579	-10,944	-12,488	-25,890	-33,716	-32,161	-85,855	131,327
Massachusetts.....	-15,550	-30,885	-43,558	-54,506	-55,443	-44,064	-32,607	-18,675	-295,288	204,945
Michigan.....	-25,441	-34,999	-32,954	-39,853	-57,267	-73,991	-95,787	-109,257	-469,549	151,589
Minnesota.....	7,441	-5,144	-9,347	-7,504	-12,513	-5,269	-5,028	-7,136	-44,500	86,871
Mississippi.....	-9,340	-7,206	-1,200	3,660	553	-16,819	3,833	-753	-27,272	10,116
Missouri.....	2,387	3,731	5,355	4,621	7,804	11,302	4,501	-2,384	37,317	50,449
Montana.....	-399	1,376	4,566	6,102	5,731	6,568	6,308	5,986	36,238	2,075
Nebraska.....	-8,364	-4,419	-2,685	-5,123	-3,515	-5,168	-5,367	-1,491	-37,132	26,464
Nevada.....	47,859	54,015	43,286	67,007	52,331	53,827	40,312	16,316	364,953	82,157
New Hampshire.....	10,507	8,365	5,499	5,454	2,722	1,790	-2,374	-2,473	29,490	13,702
New Jersey.....	-32,148	-31,049	-42,275	-51,221	-67,340	-77,639	-72,370	-56,208	-430,250	370,173
New Mexico.....	-9,406	4,542	4,383	4,966	6,981	7,703	8,082	1,032	28,283	32,959
New York.....	-165,928	-180,276	-188,515	-209,755	-248,647	-233,306	-185,638	-126,209	-1,538,274	844,299
North Carolina.....	46,295	43,785	47,499	44,338	73,418	110,632	116,245	98,074	580,286	182,816
North Dakota.....	-6,796	-4,061	-1,385	955	-3,390	-2,087	-2,251	-381	-19,396	3,083
Ohio.....	-37,792	-37,723	-33,067	-37,675	-45,033	-50,275	-47,350	-49,752	-338,667	92,711
Oklahoma.....	-10,013	1,072	1,078	-3,966	-531	15,688	14,736	7,954	23,182	40,913
Oregon.....	13,654	23,342	11,582	2,444	22,821	33,735	25,297	24,756	157,631	88,851
Pennsylvania.....	-24,247	-6,556	1,211	-3,061	-3,334	3,312	-5,056	-11,462	-49,193	128,650
Rhode Island.....	2,181	3,053	1,563	-5,659	-10,937	-11,100	-12,013	-8,816	-41,728	23,946
South Carolina.....	14,333	19,287	26,053	29,254	30,133	48,538	54,115	49,736	271,449	39,552
South Dakota.....	-1,715	-1,387	361	1,712	160	1,988	2,146	2,194	5,459	4,400
Tennessee.....	11,645	11,546	20,658	24,066	42,720	50,821	47,193	31,198	239,847	59,377
Texas.....	40,485	45,853	30,039	32,414	53,582	219,742	138,088	140,862	701,065	818,866
Utah.....	-6,435	-4,321	-8,162	-2,438	9,373	18,428	23,846	17,605	47,896	61,465
Vermont.....	666	1,471	557	67	-556	-654	-1,767	-1,703	-1,919	4,914
Virginia.....	16,126	29,478	40,783	20,517	29,335	10,184	3,796	2,678	152,897	154,105
Washington.....	16,751	14,763	9,318	14,793	23,579	47,614	31,774	40,588	199,180	159,211
West Virginia.....	-7,062	1,998	4,423	2,294	2,283	2,614	2,449	3,788	12,787	4,209
Wisconsin.....	872	5,042	602	1,700	-2,042	-5,560	-4,995	-7,022	-11,403	57,253
Wyoming.....	-3,173	2,136	148	1,050	325	3,207	6,638	5,390	15,721	1,999
Dist. of Columbia ...	-4,277	-7,556	-10,261	-7,014	-6,766	-2,638	-3,323	-1,622	-43,457	25,027

Source: Brookings analysis of U.S. Census Bureau Population Estimates Program data.

les. The top eight metro areas accounted for 49 percent of the net gains (Table G).

Metropolitan New York and Los Angeles each withstood considerable domestic out-migration, especially during the “bubble years” when many of their residents were drawn to growing, more afford-

able destinations in the South and West. During those years, international migration gains countered domestic migration declines. And as net domestic out-migration fell rapidly from its mid-decade peak by 2007–08, immigration—while down from its own peak early in the decade—held relatively steady.

**Table G: Annual Net International and Domestic Migration, Largest Immigrant Destination Metro Areas, 2000–01 to 2007–08**

<i>Metro area/ type of migration</i>	2000– 2001	2001– 2002	2002– 2003	2003– 2004	2004– 2005	2005– 2006	2006– 2007	2007– 2008	<i>Total</i>
<b>New York</b>									
International	166,837	157,472	138,747	125,810	132,549	135,277	122,908	123,058	1,102,658
Domestic	-176,418	-207,800	-236,767	-248,028	-284,253	-273,991	-219,104	-144,099	-1,790,460
<b>Los Angeles</b>									
International	124,689	117,720	103,045	93,827	98,800	98,254	89,508	89,674	815,517
Domestic	-104,034	-109,505	-119,876	-140,949	-200,728	-227,993	-221,144	-115,037	-1,239,266
<b>Miami</b>									
International	64,038	60,445	53,088	48,357	50,887	51,971	47,144	47,206	423,136
Domestic	-3,665	-1,766	-20,134	-3,199	-9,923	-50,595	-84,268	-46,997	-220,547
<b>Chicago</b>									
International	58,856	54,871	46,195	45,673	46,934	47,735	42,647	43,047	385,958
Domestic	-55,164	-68,856	-72,424	-65,555	-77,736	-69,542	-55,355	-42,110	-506,742
<b>Dallas</b>									
International	44,845	42,217	36,784	33,813	35,473	35,458	32,194	32,293	293,077
Domestic	48,552	13,919	-1,303	8,504	23,455	71,433	52,260	43,175	259,995
<b>Houston</b>									
International	40,772	38,474	33,667	30,705	32,283	32,227	29,330	29,392	266,850
Domestic	4,570	24,498	2,895	6,427	6,187	88,885	19,981	36,724	190,167
<b>San Francisco</b>									
International	38,223	35,981	31,542	28,792	30,288	30,138	27,434	27,504	249,902
Domestic	-24,917	-79,116	-74,174	-64,659	-51,236	-40,504	-20,536	5,506	-349,636
<b>Washington</b>									
International	38,132	33,480	24,643	32,068	29,807	31,879	27,244	27,975	245,228
Domestic	15,922	1,296	-8,500	-14,535	-16,790	-45,148	-35,337	-18,259	-121,351

Source: Brookings analysis of U.S. Census Bureau Population Estimates Program data.

Similar patterns defined Miami, Chicago and Washington, D.C. In each metro area, domestic out-migration dropped approaching 2008, while international migration remained positive amid small but steady declines. Those three metro areas, unlike New York and Los Angeles, posted international migration gains that exceeded domestic migration losses in 2007–08, reversing trends from the previous year. In San Francisco, the early decade “dot-com bust” fueled domestic out-migration which moderated over the course of the 2000s, even as annual immigration to the region remained positive and relatively stable.

Two Texas metro areas, Dallas and Houston, rank fifth and sixth among U.S. metropolitan areas in attracting international migrants. Like the other large gateways, Dallas and Houston showed steadily declining levels—though positive and significant levels—of migration from abroad. Unlike those other gateways, however, net domestic migration to these metro areas remained positive, and by 2007–08, contributed more to these areas’ population gains than international migration.

**Conclusion**

On a variety of dimensions, migration in the United States has come to a standstill. In the past two years, fewer Americans have moved long distances and locally than was the case for most of the post-World War II period. Some of this decline reflects the continuation of long-term trends, such as aging of the population and increased homeownership. Yet the recent sharp downturn in Americans’ mobility can be attributed to the bursting housing bubble and the financial crisis that precipitated a global recession.

The great migration slowdown generated distinct regional impacts. Several areas whose economies depended greatly on continued in-migration and growth—in the South and West regions and outer suburbs and exurbs nationwide—suddenly saw their economic engines and tax bases wither. Other areas that had lost large numbers of migrants to these fast growing magnets—previously “unaffordable” coastal metropolitan areas, declining manufacturing areas and urban cores everywhere—have seen a recent reduction in their



out-migration and potential economic gains from the migration slowdown.

How long will the current migration slowdown last? Some observers believe this is the beginning of a long-term trend, while others assert that the current migration downturn is simply a blip and that historical American mobility rates will soon resume.<sup>13</sup>

Meanwhile, commentators have voiced strong opinions about what “the other side” will look like if and when migration rates pick back up. Some view the bursting of the housing bubble and the areas it propped up—“cities in the sand” to use Richard Florida’s phrase for superheated mid-decade growth areas—as the demise of a narrow form of development that depended primarily on real estate growth, fueled by the excesses of easy credit and relatively affordable housing. Such areas, Florida suggests, will have a hard time achieving their past migration attractiveness unless more diverse economies emerge in these areas.<sup>14</sup> Christopher Leinberger sees the recent suburban housing busts as the beginning of fundamental structural change in housing markets with the pendulum swinging back to urban core living, where at the extreme, suburbs will become uninhabited “slums.”<sup>15</sup> Joel Kotkin sees the recent migration downturn as ushering in a “new localism” trend in America, a rootedness associated with an aging population, the Internet and an increased focus on family life.<sup>16</sup>

If migration did continue to stagnate at the recent 2007–09 levels, it would mark a sharp deviation from the long-term mobility and pioneering spirit that has characterized generations of Americans. The fact that, once again, new waves of immigrants and their children are populating large sections of our country and the younger segments of our age structure, suggests that the restlessness that has long linked aspirations of upward social mobility with geographic mobility is likely to continue. Domestic migration levels will probably not hit the high-water mark seen in the immediate post-World War II period, but there is reason to believe that when the housing market clears and recovery is well underway, more “normal” 1990s levels of migration will revive.

Which areas of the country will benefit will depend greatly on the preferences of more globally aware, diverse, “Millennial” 20-somethings, who will comprise an estimated 40 percent of adult migrants in the years immediately ahead. It is probably true that the attractiveness of previous real estate-fueled

growth magnets will not return to mid-decade levels anytime soon. Yet other metropolitan areas could be major draws. Already, there are signs of relatively strong economic performance in both Sun Belt and Snow Belt areas with diversified, new economy industries, or specializations in “eds and meds.”<sup>17</sup> These areas include Seattle, Austin, Washington, D.C., Houston, Dallas, San Jose and Raleigh-Durham, as well as traditional young professional magnets like New York, Chicago, Los Angeles and San Francisco. Within these broad areas, there probably will also be movement to outer suburbs and exurbs, though at reduced levels, and accompanied by a further “filling in” of their vibrant urban cores.

Moving ahead in America has long meant moving on, across both long distances (to new or better jobs) and short distances (to new or better homes). The betting here is that even the Great Recession and the great migration slowdown that accompanied it have not fundamentally altered this uniquely American idea. Migration rates eventually will rise again, but the winners and losers may look slightly different than during the last boom.

\*This article is excerpted from the report: William H. Frey, *The Great American Migration Slowdown: Regional and Metropolitan Dimensions*, Metropolitan Policy Program, The Brookings Institution, December 2009.

Notes

<sup>1</sup>Charles B. Nam, William J. Serow and David F. Sly, *International Handbook on Internal Migration* (New York: Greenwood Press, 1990); Catherine Moye, "Moving Stories." *Financial Times*, August 21, 2009; Larry H. Long, *Migration and Residential Mobility in the United States* (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1988).

<sup>2</sup>More information on these sources can be found at: ASEC (<http://www.census.gov/cps>); ACS (<http://www.census.gov/acs/www>); Population Estimates Program (<http://www.census.gov/popest/estimates.html>); IRS migration data (<http://www.irs.gov/taxstats/indtaxstats/article/0,,id=96943,00.html>). See also: Emily Gross, "Internal Revenue Service Area-to-Area Migration Data: Strengths, Limitations and Current Trends" (Internal Revenue Service, 2005).

<sup>3</sup>Reasons for moving across different distances and among different demographic groups are explored in Jason Schachter, *Why People Move: Exploring the March 2000 Current Population Survey* (U.S. Census Bureau, 2001); and D'Vera Cohn and Rich Morin, *American Mobility: Who Moves? Who Stays Put? Where's Home?* (Washington: Pew Research Center, 2008).

<sup>4</sup>Among local residential movers, those with the least education are most likely to move. In 2007–08, within-county migration rates for individuals with less than a high school education was 8.5 percent, compared with 6.3 percent for those who only graduated from high school and 4.5 percent for those who had schooling beyond college. This reflects the fact that less educated groups are more likely to be renters, who are much more prone to move than homeowners. Homeownership is less of a barrier for long-distance migrants.

<sup>5</sup>Among racial groups, blacks, Asians and Hispanics showed bigger declines in interstate migration than whites.

<sup>6</sup>"Sorrow In the Sunshine." *The Economist*, July 11, 2009, page 33. Recent estimates produced by the University of Florida Bureau of Economic Business Research also show that the state sustained an overall population loss between April 2008 and April 2009. "Preliminary 2009 Florida Population Estimates" (Gainesville, FL: University of Florida Bureau of Economic and Business Research, 2009).

<sup>7</sup>Alan Berube and others, *MetroMonitor: Tracking Economic Recession and Recovery in America's 100 Largest Metropolitan Areas*, (Brookings, September 2009).

<sup>8</sup>"Lone Star Rising: A special report on Texas." *The Economist*. July 11, 2009.

<sup>9</sup>Hans Johnson and Richard Lovelady, "Migration Between California and Other States: 1985–1994" (Sacramento: California Research Bureau of the California State Library and the Demographic Unit of the California Department of Finance, 1995); James P. Allen and Eugene Turner, "Migrants Between California and Other States." *The California Geographer* 47 (2007): 1–26; William H. Frey and Kao Lee Liaw, "Migration Within the United States: Role of Race-Ethnicity." *Brookings-Wharton Papers on Urban Affairs* (2005): 207–262; Dowell Meyers, John Pitkin and Ricardo Ramirez, "The New Homegrown Majority in California: Recognizing the New Reality of Growing Com-

mitment to the Golden State" (Los Angeles: USC School of Policy, Planning and Development, 2009).

<sup>10</sup>Berube and others, *MetroMonitor*.

<sup>11</sup>The 2008 American Community Survey (ACS) recorded a U.S. foreign-born population of 37,960,935, lower than the 38,059,694 total for 2007. The 98,759-person decline is within sampling error, but it is the first recorded decline in the U.S. foreign-born population in the ACS since 2000, or the decennial census since 1970. Nonetheless, the size of the foreign-born population is affected by mortality and fertility of long-term foreign-born residents as well as recent international movement in both directions. Thus there continue to be new immigrant flows into the United States from more direct annual international migration estimates presented in this section.

<sup>12</sup>Jeffrey Passel and D'Vera Cohn, *Mexican Immigrants: How Many Come? How Many Leave?* (Washington: Pew Hispanic Center, 2009).

<sup>13</sup>Todd Lewan, "Has Twilight Come to the Sun Belt?" *The Gainesville Sun*, May 30, 2009.

<sup>14</sup>Richard Florida, "How the Crash Will Reshape America." *The Atlantic*, March, 2009, pp. 44–56.

<sup>15</sup>Christopher B. Leinberger, "The Next Slum?" *The Atlantic*, March 2008, pp. 70–75.

<sup>16</sup>Joel Kotkin, "There is No Place Like Home." *Newsweek*, October, 19, 2009, pp. 42–43.

<sup>17</sup>Berube and others, *MetroMonitor*.

About the Author

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